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THE FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT OF
1971: THE CITIZEN'S ROLE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
Visible environmental decay has prompted an increased national
awareness of ecological problems.1 Those problems are particularly
acute for citizens of Florida. The rapid influx of new residents threatens
to upset the delicate balance of the state's fragile environment.2 The
gravity of the situation apparently is appreciated by most Floridians;
recent surveys indicate that environmental preservation is a primary
concern of the electorate. 3
In response to this increased public awareness, legislation designed
to forestall environmental deterioration has been enacted by lawmakers
throughout the nation.4 The Florida Legislature has reacted in a
similar fashion.5 Moreover, the 1968 revision of the Florida constitution
adopts as state policy the protection and conservation of natural re-
sources and scenic beauty., It might be said that the legal system has
begun to recognize a new right, the right of citizens to a clean and
healthful environment.7
The enactment of appropriate legislation, however, is not the ulti-
mate answer to environmental degradation. Unenforced laws are in-
effective laws. Because environmental legislation typically entrusts en-
forcement to administrative agencies,8 vested with important powers
1. See, e.g., Hoffman, Environmental Politics-The Deciding Factor, 46 FLA. B.J.
576, 579 (1972); Commoner, Damaged Global Fabric, in OuR WORLD IN PERIL: AN EN-
VIRONMENT REVIEW (S. Novick & D. Cottrell eds. 1971). See generally R. CARSON, SILENT
SPRING (1962).
2. Florida is one of the fastest growing states in America with an influx of 4,500
people per week. P. Meyers, A Slow Start in Paradise vii-viii, February 1974; F. BossEL-
MAN, D. CALLIEs & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 18 (1973). Furthermore, the ecological
balance in the state is already delicate. See id. at 17-18; P. Meyers, supra at 10-12; Finnell,
Saving Paradise: The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972,
1973 URB. L. ANNUAL 103, 104-07. See generally W. MCCLUNEY, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DE-
STRUCTION OF SoUTH FLORIDA (1971).
3. A statewide study conducted in March 1974 by Cambridge Survey Research, for
the Florida Defendants of the Environment, Inc., and the Florida Audubon Society,
found that 59% of Floridians felt that environmental concerns were the most important
problems facing Florida today. This percentage of environmentally concerned citizens is
significantly higher than in any other state, including California.
4. See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CoN-
TROL passim (1971). See also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (Supp. 1972); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-35
(1970).
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. chs. 380, 403 (1973).
6. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7.
7. See, e.g., ILL. CONsr. art. XI, § 2.
8. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 253.03, 403.061 (1973).
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and wide discretion to exercise that power,9 an agency diligently dis-
charging its obligation to protect the environment can foster prudent
environmental management. On the other hand, if an agency declines
to enforce the law, delegated power and discretion can become serious
obstacles to the efforts of concerned citizens seeking to compel en-
forcement.
The recent Florida Supreme Court decision in United States Steel
Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc.,10 upholding the strict standing require-
ments of the "special injury" rule, reflects the futility of public nuisance
actions initiated by private citizens to abate environmental impair-
ment or to enforce environmental legislation. Save Sand Key therefore
seems to compel exploration of other avenues for bringing polluters
before the courts. At least three alternatives to common law nuisance
actions have been suggested by commentators; 1 of the three, only
environmental protection legislation is a viable alternative in Florida
at this time. If citizens are to join in furthering Florida's constitutional
policy of environmental protection, and if citizens are to enjoy access
to the courts to redress injuries resulting from environmental destruc-
tion, as guaranteed by the constitution, 12 then the Environmental
Protection Act (EPA) must be the vehicle.
This note will discuss briefly the inadequacies of the common
law nuisance remedy in environmental litigation. Primary considera-
tion then will be given to the grant of standing conferred by Florida's
EPA, and to the potential effectiveness of that statutory grant as a
means of providing access to the courts, which frequently has been
foreclosed by traditional public nuisance doctrine.
I. CITIZEN STANDING BEFORE THE 1970's
The common law doctrine of nuisance evolved in thirteenth cen-
tury England as a remedy for the wrongful interference with the use
and enjoyment of land.13 The common law recognized two forms of
nuisance-private and public. Public nuisance can be distinguished
from private nuisance by the class of people affected. Private nuisance,
a civil wrong, involves interference with the property rights of a limited
9. See Yonge v. Askew, 293 So. 2d 395, 399-400 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(recognizing broad discretion in the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund).
10. No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12, 1974); see note 18 and accompanying text infra. For a
discussion of the special injury rule see notes 17-21 and accompanying text infra.
11. The three alternatives are: an action based on the public trust doctrine, see
pp. 740-42 infra; according standing to natural objects, see p. 742 infra; and an action
based on environmental protection acts. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 403A12 (1973).
12. FLA. CONsr. art. H, § 7.
13. See C. HAAR, LAND-UsE PLANNING 104-05 (1971); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
ToRis § 86 (4th ed. 1971).
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number of individuals' Public nuisance, originally a criminal offense,
affects the public at large. 15 Therefore, since public nuisance injures
the public generally, public agencies historically were entrusted with
protecting the environment by enjoining such nuisances.16 Private
citizens were denied a judicial hearing to abate public nuisances unless
they could show "peculiar injury ... different in kind and not merely
in degree from the injury to the public at large.' 1 7 Judicial recognition
of this so-called "special injury" rule18 has had the effect of denying
14. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 86.
15. Id.; see Prior v. White, 180 So. 347 (Fla. 1938).
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 86; see C. HAAR, supra note 13, at 138-55.
17. Brown v. Florida Chautauqua Ass'n, 52 So. 802, 804 (Fla. 1910).
18. See Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572, 573 n.3
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12, 1974).
In Save Sand Key, supra, the Second District Court of Appeal specifically rejected
the special injury rule. Appellant Save Sand Key, Inc., a nonprofit citizens' group, sought
to enjoin U.S. Steel from interfering with certain alleged vested rights of its members
in a portion of the soft-sand beach of Sand Key, a gulf-front island in Pinellas
County. These rights were claimed to have been acquired by prescription, implied
dedication or general and local custom. The group also sought injunctive relief from
an alleged "public nuisance in the form of purpresture [i.e., a barrier] blocking enjoy-
ment of those rights." Id. at 573. The court also recognized the existence of vested
prescriptive rights in the public to use a portion of the soft-sand beach, relying on a
similar holding in City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So. 2d 765 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972), vac'd, 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974). See 281 So. 2d at 577. The trial
court had dismissed Save Sand Key, Inc., from the suit " 'with prejudice' for the reason
that it 'lacks standing' to sue." 281 So. 2d at 573 (discussing unreported opinion of
trial court). The trial court had relied expressly on Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc.
v. Burns, 193 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 200 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1967).
See 281 So. 2d at 573.
In reversing the trial court's dismissal, Judge McNulty of the Second District Court
of Appeal noted that the special injury rule resulted in many a "right" going without
protection: "[I]t developed that if almost any injury was suffered jointly with the
public a single citizen so victimized could not be heard to complain unless his injury
was special in that it differed in kind and degree from the public's." Id. at 574. Judge
McNulty observed that it is an "anathema to any true system of justice to proclaim that
a right may be enjoyed by all yet none may protect it." Id. Except in strictly
nuisance cases, he noted, the approach to standing both in Florida courts, see, e.g., cases
cited id., and in the United States Supreme Court has been liberalized. Id. at 574-75.
See also Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970); Jaffe,
Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1971). Furthermore, the court felt that the
special injury rule contravenes FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 21, which provides that the courts
"shall be open to every person for redress of any injury." The court's interpretation of
art. I, § 21, is not unique. Several Florida decisions have construed § 21 to provide great-
er access to the courts than was guaranteed by the more restrictive language of FLA.
CONsT. Decl. of Rts. § 4 (1885). The following decisions have cited § 21 as a basis
(though not necessarily the sole basis) for granting access to the courts: Yordon v. Savage,
279 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1973) (mother as well as father has a cause of action for damages
as a result of injury to son); Garner v. Ward, 251 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971) (allowing inter-
vention in wrongful death suit by decedent's first wife); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40
(Fla. 1971) (wife of injured husband has cause of action for loss of consortium); Stewart
v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974)
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standing to private citizens who wish to litigate alleged environmental
impairment and destruction. The rule evolved because of the judiciary's
fear that a multiplicity of environmental suits would constitute a
greater evil than would the continued existence of most nuisances.1
9
Moreover, since the authority to bring environmental actions has im-
portant economic and political consequences public agencies sometimes
are reluctant to share this power." As a result, injustices to both private
citizens and the general public have occurred: destruction and impair-
ment of the environment have gone unchecked when the responsible
agencies have failed to act."
Public awareness of and concern for a stable environment peaked
in the late 1960's. 22 As Americans became environmentally conscious,
they grew intolerant of administrative agencies that were failing to
protect the public interest in a healthful environment.2 3 Even the
(rejecting "impact rule" in personal injury actions); Leonard v. McIntosh, 237 So. 2d
809 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (accused denied speedy trial entitled to seek a writ
of prohibition against judge).
Judge McNulty then declared that "it's time to say . . . that the 'special injury' con-
cept serves no valid purpose in the present structure of the law and should no longer
be a viable expedient to the disposition of [nuisance] cases." 281 So. 2d at 575. The
judge rejected the argument that "multiplicitousness" is a valid danger. Id. The court
also noted the deterrent effects of the great expense of litigation, res judicata and
the judiciary's ability to screen out spite suits. Id. The opinion concluded by rejecting
the special injury rule and formulating a new general rule for standing:
[A] person who is entitled to enjoyment of a right or who directly and personally
suffers or is about to suffer an injury may sue for relief or redress whether or
not such right or injury is special to him or is shared in common with the public
generally.
Id. at 577.
Despite the appeals court's well reasoned opinion, the Florida Supreme Court re-
versed. United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12, 1974).
The high court criticized the appeals court for not certifying the question to the supreme
court and upheld the special injury rule. Id. The Save Sand Key decision relies on and
reaffirms the holding in Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Burns, 193 So. 2d 691 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 200 So. 2d 178 (1967). Therefore, the special injury
rule clearly retains vitality in public nuisance actions in Florida.
But see FLA. STAT. §§ 60.06, 823.05 (1973), which permit private citizens standing
to protest certain nuisances and require no special injury. See National Container
Corp. v. State ex rel. Stockton, 189 So. 4 (Fla. 1939).
19. See Jacksonville, T. & K.W. Ry. v. Thompson, 16 So. 282, 283 (Fla. 1894); Garnett
v. Jacksonville, St. A. & H.R. Ry., 20 Fla. 889 (1884).
20. See Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572, 574-75 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12, 1974).
21. Id.; see Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A
Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. Rxv. 1004, 1004-06 (1972); Hoffman, Environmental
Politics-The Deciding Factor, 46 FLA. B.J. 576, 577 (1972).
22. See Note, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Congressional Cosmetic, 61
GEoRGETOWN L.J. 153, 154-59 (1972).
23. See Hoffman, supra note 21, at 576-77.
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passage of federal and state statutes to protect the air, water and natural
resources, however, did not ensure that reluctant public officials would
exercise their authority to enjoin violations.24 As a result of this reluc-
tance, private citizens endeavored to find ways to more actively involve
the judiciary in environmental protection.
The "special injury rule" proved to be a formidable deterrent to
a successful action founded on common law public nuisance;25
plaintiffs, therefore, have been forced to resort to other legal theories
in order to have their grievances heard in court. One suggested ap-
proach involves broadening the historically narrow scope of the "public
trust doctrine. " 26 This doctrine requires that the submerged sovereign-
ty lands27 of the state be protected and held in trust for the public.28
By analogy the doctrine could be extended to all of the state's natural
resources. Under the public trust doctrine, the Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund may be sued if their actions fail to comport
with the Trustees' duty to protect the public interest in submerged
land.29 Extension of this doctrine could provide a cause of action
against a governmental agency that had failed to discharge its duty
to protect the public interest in any natural resource of the state.80
24. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective judicial
Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 473, 473-74 (1970).
25. See United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12,
1974).
26. For discussion of the evolution of the doctrine, see Sax, supra note 24, at 473-90;
Hoffman, supra note 21, at 578-79.
27. See Note, Florida's Sovereignty Submerged Lands: What Are They, Who Owns
Them and Where Is the Boundary?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 596 (1973).
28. See FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 11; FLA. STAT. § 253.02 (1973); Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 13 So. 640, 646
(Fla. 1893); Sax, supra note 24; Note, Conveyances of Sovereign Lands Under the Public
Trust Doctrine: When Are They in the Public Interest?, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 285 (1972).
29. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 US. 387 (1892); State v. Black River Phosphate
Co., 13 So. 640, 645 (Fla. 1893); Note, supra note 27, at 596-99.
30. When the state holds land in trust for the people of the state and the state
violates that trust by failing to protect such publicly owned lands, the public trust
doctrine provides the people of the state with a cause of action to enforce the trust.
See Sax, supra note 24; Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines
and Evolving Theories To Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1085, 1123 (1970). His-
torically, the scope of the public trust doctrine has been narrow, limited to such land
as parklands or land below the mean high-water mark. Sax, supra note 24, at 556; Note,
supra note 27, at 600-03. The Florida constitution, as revised in 1968, incorporates the
public trust doctrine in art. X, § 11: "Sale of . . . [sovereignty] lands may be authorized
by law, but only when in the public interest." See Note, supra note 27, at 598-99.
The general trend in the United States is to prohibit by statute the sale of trust
lands to private interests. See Sax, supra note 24, at 548. For example, Florida statutorily
mandates that sovereign lands be held in trust for the public by the Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund. Furthermore, such lands cannot be conveyed unless the
Trustees determine that the sale is in the public interest. See FLa. STAT. § 253.12 (1973);
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Such an application of the doctrine seems logical; the Trustees'
"fiduciary duty" with respect to submerged land seems no more
sacred than, for example, the duty of the Department of Pollution
Control to protect the air and water quality of the state.3 ' Agency
actions that affect natural resources other than submerged lands and
are contrary to the public interest should give rise to a cause of action
just as readily as do detrimental decisions that affect submerged lands.
The two causes of action seem distinguishable only with respect to
historical precedent 32 and the name of the agency charged with the
trust.33
It seems anachronistic to limit the application of the public trust
doctrine to sovereignty lands alone. Many agencies hold natural re-
sources in trust for the public;3 4 extension of the public trust doctrine
to all those resources would enable the beneficiaries of this trust, the
citizens, to sue when the duty to protect the public interest is breach-
ed.3 5 The courts could promote reasonable management of the en-
vironment by ensuring that decisions reached by regulatory agencies
comport with the duty to act for the benefit of the public. Administra-
tive decisions that the courts find unsupportable could be remanded
to the appropriate agency with instructions to provide further infor-
mation justifying its decision. 3 The fact remains, however, that no
Sax, supra note 24, at 548-50. These statutory standards ensure "the availability of a
record for review," insulate "agencies from pressures which might otherwise be placed
upon them" and restrain "excessive localism in dealing with resources." Id. at 550.
Sax persuasively argues that the public trust doctrine should be broadened to apply
to any publicly held resources. See id. at 473-508. He concludes that the
fundamental function of courts in the public trust area is one of democratization
.... When a claim is made on behalf of diffuse public uses, courts take the first
step in the process by withdrawing the usual presumption that all relevant issues
have been adequately considered and resolved by routine statutory and adminis-
trative processes.
Id. at 561.
31. See FLA. S-rAT. §§ 403.011-.411 (1973).
32. See notes 17-21, 26-30 supra.
33. See FLA. STAT. ch. 253 (1973).
34. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 161.041, 403.061 (1973).
35. See Sax, supra note 24, at 557-65.
36. One commentator has emphasized the effect of judicial remand of agency de-
cisions:
I have said that this concept of increased participation is the most significant
contribution of the judiciary. The reason is that it goes to the very structure
of the administrative process. The great limitation, as we have seen, of the ad-
ministrative process is that in many cases it is unrepresentative. Permanently
organized interests . . . are overrepresented ....
Jaffe, Ecological Goals and the Ways and Means of Achieving Them, 75 W. VA. L. REV.
1, 20 (1972). See also Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81
YALEL.J. 359 (1972).
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Florida court has extended the public trust doctrine beyond its present
limits.
Another proposed method of encouraging prudent environmental
management is to confer standing on "natural objects" in the environ-
ment.37 Like the suggested extension of the public trust doctrine, this
proposal has not won many adherents.
Still a third means of involving the judiciary in environmental pro-
tection is the enactment of legislation providing private citizens with
standing to initiate environment-related suits. Statutory, standing can
make the courts more readily accessible to plaintiffs seeking to compel
governmental and private compliance with environmental laws.3 8 En-
vironmental protection acts3 9 in eleven states4 ° provide statutory stand-
ing and, if those provisions are construed liberally by the courts, the
need to expand the public trust doctrine or to grant standing to natural
objects may be obviated.
The remainder of this note, therefore, will consider in some de-
tail the potential scope of, and possible obstacles to, the use of legis-
latively established standing to prompt an increased judicial role in
environmental protection. The significance of this judicial role should
not be underestimated; legislation enacted to protect the environment
is meaningless if those charged with enforcing the law fail in their
duty. Of course, any of the suggested methods for increased judicial
review of environmental regulation might be frustrated by the judi-
ciary's reluctance to interfere with administrative agency decisions.41
37. C. STONE, SHouLD TREEs HAVE STANDING? (1974). "I am quite seriously proposing
that we give legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called 'natural objects'
in the environment-indeed, to the natural environment as a whole." Id. at 9. Since
corporations, municipalities and universities have standing, the idea is not novel. Id.
at 10, 17.
38. Sax & Conner, supra note 21, at 1004-05.
39. The names of the various acts that legislatively extend standing to environmental-
ly concerned plaintiffs vary somewhat from state to state. Most, however, are titled, "En-
vironmental Protection Act." This Note will use Environmental Protection Act (EPA)
when discussing this type of legislation despite the fact that the actual titles vary in
some cases.
40. As of July 1974 the following statutes granted standing to individuals in en-
vironmental litigation: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2712(d) (Supp. 1973); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 39077.7 (West 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-34-12 (Perm. Cum. Supp.
1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-142 (Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1002(a)(v)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-6-1-1(a) (Burns code ed. 1973); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 10A (Supp. 1974); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202 (Supp.
1974-75); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.540-.570 (1973).
Illinois also provides in its constitution for standing to challenge environmental de-
struction. See ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
41. Some reluctance is, of course, appropriate because most administrative agencies
possess a degree of expertise and familiarity with the case which the court lacks. See
1972 Wise. L. REv. 934, 941.
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That reluctance must be overcome, however, because the courthouse
is at least one step removed from political and economic influences
that traditionally have affected administrative decision-making.
II. PRESENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACTS
A. Statutory Comparison
The legislative establishment of standing for private citizens to
litigate environmental issues is a relatively recent phenomenon. Be-
cause of the recent genesis of environmental protection acts, the con-
struction and interpretation of such legislation is not well settled.
Therefore it is helpful to examine and compare the various state
statutes and case law in order to delineate the possible scope of Florida's
EPA.
Since environmental protection acts in other states42 have been in
effect only since 1971, reported cases interpreting those acts have been
decided only recently. The acts can be characterized and distinguished
by the scope of standing conferred, the cause of action established and
the remedies provided.
About half of these new acts limit standing to "citizens" or resi-
dents of the state.4 3 Indiana, for example, expressly grants standing
to "any citizen of the state."44 Massachusetts, on the other hand, re-
quires that ten citizens join as plaintiffs before standing can be assert-
ed.45 The requirement of state citizenship undoubtedly is a response
to the fear of a multiplicity of suits; additionally, the requirement en-
sures that the suit involves some local interest. 46 Other state acts are
more liberal and confer standing on any "person." Michigan's act
provides that "any person ... may maintain an action ... for the pro-
tection of the air, water and other natural resources and the public
trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction." 47 Similarly,
Colorado's act states that "[a]ny person may initiate an action." 48
42. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2701 (Supp. 1973); CAL. HEALTH ge SAFETY CODE §§ 39077-79.6
(West 1973); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-34-1 to -14 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1971); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 1001-07 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-6-1-1
(Burns code ed. 1973); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1201 (Supp. 1974-75); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 116B.01-.13 (Supp. 1974).
43. FLA. STAT. § 403A12(2)(a) (1973); IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-1-1(a) (Burns code ed.
1973); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 204, § 10A (Supp. 1974-75); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03
(Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.540-.570 (1973).
44. IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-1-1(a) (Burns code ed. 1973); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03
(Supp. 1974), which provides standing to "[a]ny person residing within the state."
45. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 10A (Supp. 1974-75).
46. See notes 177-79 and accompanying text infra.
47. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202 (Supp. 1974).
48. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-34-12 (Perm. Cum, Supp. 1971),
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Perhaps the most interesting question presented by these state
acts is whether standing is conferred on nonprofit corporations, such
as the Audubon Society or the Sierra Club. The courts' resolution of
this question will have important practical consequences. The
economics of litigation make the courts unavailable to the vast ma-
jority of private "citizens" and "persons."9 Therefore, if concerned
corporations and associations are not afforded standing, many potential
plaintiffs, for all practical purposes, will be barred from pressing en-
vironmental claims in the courts.
The causes of action created by the environmental protection acts
vary considerably. Arkansas and Georgia limit causes of action to al-
leged violations of a particular environmental law.5 0 California, Florida,
Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota and Nevada grant
causes of action for alleged violation of any state, local or regional
statute, regulation, rule or order that exists for the protection of the
air, water and other natural resources.5 ' For example, Nevada enables
any citizen to commence an action to "enforce compliance with any
statute, regulation, or ordinance for the protection of the air, water
and other natural resources from pollution, impairment or destruc-
tion . . . ."52 The most liberal statutory causes of action, however, do
not require violation of an existing environmental regulation or law
as a condition precedent to filing suit. Colorado, for example, affords
any person a cause of action to accomplish the purpose of the act,
which is
to establish minimum controls to prohibit the pollution of the air,
water, and land, to prevent the degradation of the natural en-
vironment of recreational and mountain areas in this state in
order to preserve and maintain the ecology and environment in its
natural condition, to facilitate the enjoyment of the state, its
ecology, nature, and scenery by the inhabitants and visitors of the
state, and to protect their health, safety, and welfare.53
The Illinois statute is similarly broad.54
Finally, the various states' environmental protection acts may be
49. See Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572, 575 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12, 1974).
50. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2712(d) (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-142 (Supp. 1973).
51. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39077.7 (West 1973); FLA. STAT. § 403.412
(1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-6-1-1(a) (Bums code ed. 1973); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch.
214, § 10A (Supp. 1974-75); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202 (Supp. 1974-75); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. 41.540-.570 (1973).
52. NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.540 (1973).
53. COLO. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 66-34-12 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1971).
54. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1002(a)(v) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
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distinguished by the type of relief granted. California, Florida and
Georgia provide only injunctive relief.5 5 Indiana, Michigan and Min-
nesota allow declaratory and equitable remedies. 5 Nevada provides
for enforcement orders and other equitable relief.5 7 Arkansas, Colo-
rado and Illinois do not limit the available remedy.
58
Although the environmental protection acts apparently broaden
private citizens' standing in environmental litigation, the language
of the statutes does not delineate precisely how far that standing has
been extended. For example, the application of the special injury
rule59 and the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine60 to
statutory standing is seldom addressed by the language of the various
EPA's. California's EPA, however, expressly provides that the plaintiff
"shall not be required to allege facts necessary to show or tending to
show lack of adequate remedy at law or to show or tending to show
irreparable damage or loss."' This provision seems to abrogate the
special injury rule and exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine
in environmental litigation. The Florida and Nevada acts require
that the plaintiff give written notice of his intent to the appropriate
agency 30 days before filing suit.62 During this grace period the offend-
ing party or agency may correct the source of pollution or impair-
55. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39077.7 (West 1973); FLA. STAT. § 403A12(3)
(1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-142 (Supp. 1973).
56. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-6-1-1(a) (Burns code ed. 1973); MIcH. ComP. LAws
ANN. § 691.1202 (Supp. 1974-75); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 (Supp. 1974).
57. NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.560 (1973).
58. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2712(d) (Supp. 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. § 66-34-12 (Perm.
Cum. Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. IlIV2, § 1002(a)(v) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
59. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
60. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is an established rule of
judicial administration that is used in equity and at law. It requires that "[w]here an
administrative remedy is provided by statute, such remedy ordinarily must be exhausted
before a litigant may resort to the courts." 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and
Procedures § 41 (1951). Where administrative review of a complaint is available as of
right, access to the courts may be denied simply because of the complainant's failure to
avail himself of that administrative right. See 1 FLA. JuR. Administrative Law § 161
(1955). One purpose of the rule is to prevent administrative bodies from transferring
their duties to the judiciary. C.J.S., supra § 41. Some jurisdictions limit application of
the doctrine to actions brought by private parties. Id. The rule is not absolute, how-
ever; in some situations a litigant need not pursue "to appropriate conclusion" and
await "until final outcome" as a condition precedent to a judicial hearing. Id. Exceptions
to the rule include the following: extreme cases in which compliance would be useless,
see City of Miami Beach v. Jonathon Corp., 238 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970);
cases in which irreparable injury would probably result, CJS, supra § 41; and other
special situations, see Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1967) (exceptions in
certain zoning cases). See generally I FLA. JUR., supra § 175 (Supp. 1974).
61. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39077.7 (West 1973).
62. See FLA. STAT. § 403A12(2)(c) (1973); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.540(1) (1973).
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ment and thus avoid litigation. The filing of notice apparently is the
only administrative remedy that must be exhausted in these states.6"
Other state statutes, however, do not speak clearly to the problems of
special injury and exhaustion of remedies. This lack of specificity
could result in dismissal of a suit for failure to plead special injury
or to exhaust administrative remedies, even though standing apparent-
ly is conferred on the plaintiff by statute.
B. Precedent Outside Florida
The lack of precise language in most environmental protection
acts allows or, perhaps, invites judicial interpretation. Thus the liberal
or strict interpretation of these statutes by the judiciary ultimately will
establish the effectiveness of the EPA's for use by environmentally con-
cerned citizens. Not until 1973 and early 1974, however, did several
state appellate courts begin to interpret and apply their acts. The
treatment of EPA's in other jurisdictions may be indicative of the
general reception such legislation will be accorded by the judiciary.
Moreover, the Florida courts-because of the dearth of EPA case law
in Florida-may look to other jurisdictions when called upon to in-
terpret Florida's EPA. Therefore, it may be helpful to examine judicial
acceptance and construction of EPA's generally, in order to ascertain
the Florida Act's potential scope.
In County of Freeborn v. Bryson6 4 the Minnesota Supreme Court
ruled that the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act65 restricts local
government discretion to locate public improvements. 6 The court
63. Nevada and Florida EPA statutes expressly provide that administrative agencies
have 30 days in which to correct the alleged violation. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(c) (1971);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.540(1) (1973). By implication it seems that in these two states
the plaintiff need not allege exhaustion of administrative remedies; rather it seems that
he need plead only that the agency has been given 30 days to correct the violation, and
has failed to do so. Since the acts expressly require the filing of a verified complaint
and a 30-day waiting period, it would seem that had the legislature intended additional
administrative action then it would have stated that intent. Filing of the complaint is
intended to draw the agency's attention to the alleged violation of an environmental
law. The purpose of the 30-day waiting period is to allow the agency to avoid litigation
by taking immediate steps to correct the alleged EPA violation. Prompt agency action
avoids lengthy litigation delays during which irreparable environmental injury could
occur.
The remaining EPA's do not address administrative action, and therefore these
statutes impliedly may require that the plaintiff allege exhaustion of remedies. See, e.g.,
City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 308 N.E.2d 488, 504 (Mass. 1974). How-
ever, if irreparable injury probably would result, then an exception to the doctrine
may exist. See note 60 supra; cf. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TEXT § 21.01 (1972).
64. 210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973).
65. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01-.13 (Supp. 1974).
66. 210 N.W.2d at 295. In the County of Freeborn case a county sought to condemn
part of a farmer's land for a road. The landowner complained that the proposed con-
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interpreted "person" to include conservation groups and granted the
Sierra Club standing.6 7 The Act was found to require that decisions
affecting the environment be made by balancing "ecological against
technical considerations. ' ' 68 Thus, while a cause of action requires a
prima facie showing of "(1) protectable natural resource, and (2) pol-
lution, impairment or destruction of that resource," the prima facie
case "may be rebutted by showing that there is 'no feasible or prudent
alternative' or that the conduct is in the best interest of the public."69
It should be noted, however, that the court indicated that it was
compelled by legislative intent to interpret the statute broadly.70
Nevertheless, the same court six months later upheld the dismissal of
another case 71 filed pursuant to the same act, and recognized that en-
forcement of the Minnesota EPA is limited by the statutory procedural
safeguards of prior notice and an adequate hearing.7 2
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts liberally construed
that state's environmental protection act, holding that it provides a
demnation would destroy a natural wildlife marsh. Expert witnesses testified that the
highway would in fact have detrimental effects on the marsh. Before the county could
present its defenses, the trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a prima
facie case. The supreme court reversed, holding that the county should have an opportuni-
ty to present its affirmative defenses, since a valid cause of action was pleaded under
the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act. If such defenses were unsuccessful, the county
would be prevented from taking the property. Id. at 292-97.
67. Id. at 295.
68. Id. at 297.
69. Id. at 297-98. The balancing test used by the court in County of Freeborn is
the result of the court's interpretation of portions of the Minnesota Environmental
Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04 (Supp. 1974). The Minnesota Act is more ex-
haustive than the Florida EPA in that the former specifically addresses the questions of
the burden of proof and affirmative defenses. The Florida EPA does not expressly
formulate a similar balancing test. Nonetheless, the Minnesota court's characterization
of the judicial function in the EPA litigation seems to be a good one: The court
balances evidence of environmental damage to a protectable resource against rebutting
evidence that there is no reasonable alternative means to conduct the activity and that
such activity both is consistent with the public welfare and is required to promote
that welfare. See 210 N.W.2d at 297-98. Such an approach places the burden of proof
on the "polluter" once a prima facie case of environmental damage is made. Moreover,
the balancing test encourages informed and sagacious decisions by providing that the
court weigh the practical import of promoting public welfare through development
against the possibly overriding concern of protecting the environment. The Florida
EPA does not expressly formulate a similar judicial role; it leaves that task to the
courts. Nevertheless, the utility of the judicial role assumed in the County of Freeborn
EPA litigation seems apparent.
70. See id. at 296.
71. State ex rel. Ludwig v. City of Bemidji, 212 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1973).
72. Id. at 878. The opinion reasoned that the statutory safeguards mandate that
before a city's permit to pollute could be revoked, the city must be given adequate
notice that it is in violation of newly drafted pollution standards. Furthermore, the
city must be informed of the consequence of its violation and be given an opportunity
to be heard. Id. at 880; see note 83 infra.
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cause of action to enforce procedural as well as substantive violations
of air pollution control regulations. 3 The opinion offers a provocative
explanation of the important distinction between standing and juris-
diction under the Massachusetts act.7 4 The case involved a suit by the
city of Boston to enjoin construction of a new passenger terminal by
the Massachusetts Port Authority. The Authority argued that the city
lacked statutory standing to sue because the Authority's alleged pro-
cedural violation did not constitute environmental damage "about to
occur. " 75 The supreme court explained that this argument did not
go to the city's standing; rather, it raised the issue of the court's juris-
diction under the terms of the act.16 Statutory standing was expressly
granted by the act "upon the petition of any political subdivision";"
therefore the city had standing. The court reasoned that the real issue
raised by the city's complaint was the "question of whether the
plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the
Superior Court under the terms of [the act],"' 78 and that jurisdiction
can be invoked only if the complaint alleges that "damage to the en-
vironment is occurring or is about to occur."79 The opinion concluded
that an alleged procedural violation of an environmental regulation
provides such jurisdiction because the department's regulatory scheme
is comprehensive: compliance with each element of the regulations is
essential to the effective prevention of air pollution.8 0 Hence, "[i]f one
of the principal purposes (i.e., the prevention of air pollution) of [the
act] is to be realized, then a petition under that section must lie to en-
force the entire air pollution regulatory scheme."8' In short, pro-
cedural as well as substantive violations were found sufficient to invoke
jurisdiction of the court and afford plaintiff a remedy. This expansive
interpretation8 2 of the Massachusetts environmental protection act
has very practical consequences. Enforcement of procedural require-
ments can indirectly deter pollution or impairment of natural re-
73. City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 308 N.E.2d 488, 494-95 (Mass.
1974).
74. See id. at 493-94. The procedural violation committed by the authority was its
failure to submit the terminal plans to the Department of Public Health for approval.
Id. at 491-92.
75. Id. at 493.
76. See id.
77. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214, § 10A (Supp. 1974-75).
78. 308 N.E.2d at 493.
79. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214, § 10A (Supp. 1974-75).
80. 308 N.E.2d at 494-95.
81. Id. at 494.
82. But see id. at 504, where the court applies the exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine to EPA actions.
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sources because, if procedural violations are enjoined, substantive
violations are not likely to occur.
EPA suits also have been reported from Illinois s8 Michigan"' and
85. The Illinois courts have decided a number of cases under the Illinois Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1970, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , §§ 1001-51 (Supp. 1974), most of
which are not relevant to the focus of this note. Relevant Illinois cases, however, sug-
gest a somewhat restrictive application of the Act in certain areas. For example, the
supreme court has held that under the "exhaustion of remedies" doctrine, see note 60
supra, in order for an aggrieved party to appeal an Illinois Pollution Control Board
order, that party must have participated in the Board's hearing. See Lake County
Contractors Assoc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 294 N.E.2d 259, 262 (Ill. 1973); cf. W.F.
Hall Printing Co. v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 306 N.E.2d 595, 597 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
Moreover, several Illinois appeals court cases, involving the sufficiency of evidence, seem
to place a somewhat heavy burden of proof on the advocate of environmental protection.
It must be noted, however, that the advocate involved in each of these cases was an
administrative agency, the Pollution Control Board. In one case, the court rejected the
proposition that the Board need only show a potential violation of its pollution tables
to shift the burden to the alleged offending party:
Requiring the appellant to assume such a burden is . . . not supported by the
regulations, is ambiguous in light of the regulation itself and is of doubtful pro-
priety in view of the nature of the sanctions which the Board is authorized to
impose.
George E. Hoffman & Sons, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 306 N.E.2d 350, 334 (I1. App.
Ct. 1974). Another court, in reviewing the evidence presented in a Board hearing, vacated
the Board's order because the evidence failed to support the "fact" of a violation; the
Board was required to prove more than an "ability" of the offending party to violate its
standards. Central Ill. Light Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 308 N.E.2d 153, 155
(Ill. App. Ct. 1974). Thus these two opinions appear to require the Pollution Control
Board to justify its tabular figures and to prove actual, rather than possible, violations
of the Board's pollution standards before it can obtain a judicial remedy. However, an-
other district court of appeals upheld Board orders when it found "substantial evidence
in the record" to support them. See Incinerator, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd.,
305 N.E.2d 35, 41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Cobin v. Pollution Control Bd., 307 N.E.2d 191,
199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
Despite a rather restrictive reading of some areas of the Act, when faced with consti-
tutional issues the Illinois courts seem to have charted a liberal course. For example, an
appeals court upheld a Pollution Control Board cease and desist order, and rejected
the argument that the order was an unconstitutional taking of property. See Cobin v.
Pollution Control Bd., 307 N.E.2d 191, 199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). The court rejected the
argument that the order was an unconstitutional taking of property without compensa-
tion, and reasoned that the Board was only exercising its reasonable police power. More-
over, the court felt that denying the Board such an effective enforcement device not only
would deprive it of a useful remedy but also would "make violation of laws and regula-
tions . . . a profitable enterprise." Id. An Illinois court also considered the impact of
the due process requirement of proper notice on the enforcement of environmental laws.
See George E. Hoffman & Sons, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 306 N.E.2d 330 (111. App.
Ct. 1974). The Illinois court reached a result contrary to that of a Minnesota case in-
volving a similar question. See note 72 and accompanying text supra. The court chose
not to tie the hands of the Pollution Control Board with strict statutory notice require-
ments. 306 N.E.2d at 331. Another Illinois case held that, in the absence of odor
standards, the Board can decide on a case-by-case basis whether odor pollution has in
fact occurred. In other words, the offending party was not denied due process simply
because the Board had no published criteria on which to base odor pollution decisions.
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federal district courts.85 The judicial treatment of EPA actions in
those jurisdictions generally has been favorable. None of the reported
cases, however, involves the precise issue that is the present subject of
inquiry. In fact, most of the case law involves suits brought by govern-
mental bodies rather than by private citizens. Nonetheless, the reported
cases do reflect a liberal reading of EPA's by the judiciary. Further-
more, the balancing test formulated by the Minnesota Supreme
Court,86 and the jurisdiction-standing distinction applied by the
Massachusetts high court,8 7 are valuable precedents for construing and
applying environmental protection acts.
III. FLORIDA'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT OF 1971
A. Legislative History and Legislative Intent
The expansive language of Florida's Environmental Protection
Act suggests that the legislature intended to provide for broad citizens'
participation in environmental management:
(2)(a) The department of legal affairs, any political subdivision
or municipality of the state, or a citizen of the state may maintain an
action for injunctive relief against:
1. Any governmental agency or authority charged by law with the
See W.F. Hall Printing Co. v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 306 N.E.2d 595, 598-99 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1974). See generally Fitzpatrick, Private Legal Remedies to Air Pollution in
Illinois, 59 ILL. B.J. 746 (1971); Note, Environmental Protection in Illinois: A Comparison
of State Laws, 1973 URB. L. ANNUAL 353.
84. Michigan's EPA, see note 47 supra, was the first legislation of its kind
enacted. Nevertheless, there seem to be surprisingly few reported EPA cases in that
state. An article studying the progress of the Michigan EPA found positive reaction to the
EPA in Michigan trial courts. See Sax & Connor, supra note 21, at 1006-09. This favorable
reception of the EPA has resulted in negotiated settlements in several cases, which
may account for the dearth of case law. Id. at 1010-14. Sax and Connor go on to state
that the courts have exhibited a readiness to examine the merits of a case as soon
as possible, and have shown an understanding of the issues in most instances. Id. at 1032-
33. Moreover, Michigan's EPA seems to have had an impact on both administrative
agencies and the private sector. For example, Michigan Farmer cautioned its readers to
adopt pollution guidelines voluntarily. Id. at 1053, citing MICHIGAN FARMER, March 4, 1972.
85. In Illinois ex rel. Scott v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973),
the state of Illinois attempted to enforce its environmental protection act against the
City of Milwaukee, which was dumping raw sewage into Lake Michigan. The city
asserted that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)-(c)
(Supp. II 1972), preempted all state remedies; thus Illinois could not enjoin the pollu-
tion through its state environmental law. The federal court held that the federal
remedies are only supplemental to "any pre-existing state remedies," and stated that
if Congress had intended to preempt state remedies, such an intent would have been
expressly stated in the Act. 366 F.2d at 300-01.
86. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 75-79 and accompanying text supra,
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duty of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations for the protection of
the air, water, and other natural resources of the state to compel
such governmental authority to enforce such laws, rules, and regula-
tions;
2. Any person, natural or corporate, governmental agency or au-
thority to enjoin such persons, agencies, or authorities from violating
any laws, rules or regulations for the protection of the air, water,
and other natural resources of the state.88
Moreover, although the legislative history of Florida's EPA is some-
what sparse, there is nothing in that history to imply that the Act is
to be strictly construed. The tortuous route that the Act followed
through the legislature" might explain the fact that apparently only
one document exists even remotely bearing on legislative intent. That
document is an "abstract" in the Environmental Pollution Control
88. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(a) (1973).
89. On April 6, 1971, House Bill 386 (H.R. 386), entitled "An act relating to air
and water pollution," was introduced by Representatives Richard Hodes and David
Clark. FLA. H.R. JouR. 30 (1971). That bill provided that "the attorney general, any
person, or any political subdivision of the state may maintain an action for declaratory
and equitable relief against the state, any political subdivision thereof or any person
or legal entity for the protection of the natural resources of the state .... " Id. The
same day a similarly titled bill, H.R. 430, was introduced by Representative Guy Spicola.
Id. at 34. It appears to have been based on the Michigan "Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon
Rockwell environmental protection act of 1970," which was drafted by Professor Sax.
See MICH. COmp. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1973-74); Sax & Connor, supra
note 21, at 1006 n.9. H.R. 430 also related to "protection of the air, water, and other
natural resources of the state." FLA. H.R. JouR. 34 (1971). Both bills were referred to
the Committee on Environmental Pollution Control, which was chaired by Representative
Spicola. This committee recommended a committee substitute for H.R. 386 and H.R. 430.
Id. at 79.
On April 14, 1971, the committee substitute was amended and passed by a vote
of 107 to 5. Id. at 158. In April 1971 Senators Robert Graham and Gerald Lewis intro-
duced S. 327, entitled "Pollution Control; Relief procedures." FLA. S. Jout. 25, 131, 153, 401
(1971). On May 31, 1971, S. 327 was laid aside and the House's committee substitute was
referred to the Judiciary Civil B Committee, and then amended and certified to the
House. Id. at 606-07. In fact, the Senate's amendments were a complete rewrite of both
the bill and title of the committee substitute. See FLA. H.R. JoUR. 944-45 (1971). The
Senate amendments were approved by the House by a 94 to 3 vote. id. at 945. On
June 14, 1971, the bill was presented to the Governor and signed into law as Fla. Laws
1971, ch. 71-343 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (1973)).
The Judiciary Civil B Committee, chaired by Senator Mallory Home, actually drafted
the EPA. Unfortunately, however, the file on this committee contains no discussion of
legislative intent. The only intent that has been recorded appears in the title of the
act. See file on 1971 Judiciary Civil B Committee (House of Rep. Library, Holland
Building, Tallahassee, Florida). The file of Representative Spicola's Committee on En-
vironmental Pollution Control of 1971 is similarly barren of the EPA's legislative his-
tory, see file on 1971 Committee on Environmental Pollution Control (House of Rep.
Library, Holland Building, Tallahassee, Florida) [hereinafter cited as Committee File],
except for one abstract. See notes 90-91 and accompanying text infra.
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Committee file which discusses the "semantical breakdown of efforts
in the environmental field [which] range from 'pollution control' to
'preservation' . .....90 This abstract, as part of a ten-state comparison,
concluded:
On environmental grounds, the traditional policy of local con-
trol of land use management through zoning has contributed to
urban sprawl, destruction of open space, shorelines, and wetlands,
building in floodplains, concentrating industrial and other waste
sources in vulnerable parts of the environment or near human
living centers increasing exposure to pollution, noise, nuisance and
other environmental hazards. It has been argued that local authori-
ties are too susceptible to political and economic pressure and can-
not look beyond their jurisdictional boundaries. 91
This language seems to reflect a recognized need for increased numbers
of private attorneys general to police the environment; it therefore
seems logical that the EPA's statutory grant of standing should be
construed liberally to fulfill that need.
Nor does the context of the EPA suggest that a strict construction
was intended. The EPA is one part of a comprehensive legislative
scheme-Florida statutes chapter 403, the Florida Air and Water Pollu-
tion Control Act-which provides a wide variety of statutory vehicles
designed to forestall environmental degradation. This chapter creates
the Department of Pollution Control (DPC),92 which has broad powers
and duties to control and prohibit pollution.93 Moreover, chapter 403
includes several acts, in addition to the EPA, which evince a legisla-
tive concern for the environment: Florida Water Pollution Control
and Sewage Treatment Plant Grant Act of 1970;14 Florida Litter Law
of 1971 ;95 State Bond Program and Sewage Treatment Revolving Loan
Program;96 Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act.97
Finally, the broad reach of the EPA itself, as reflected in the title
of the Act, seems to indicate a legislative intention to encourage
judicial intervention in environmental management:
An act relating to protection of the air, water, and other natural
resources of the state; providing for actions for injunctive relief for
90. Abstract: Philosophical Approach 3. in Committee File.
91. Id. at 22.
92. FLA. STAT. § 403.045 (1973).
93. FLA. STAT. § 403.061 (1973).
94. FLA. STAT. §§ 403.1821-33 (1973).
95. FLA. STAT. § 403A13 (1973).
96. FLA. STAT. § 403.1835 (1973).
97. FLA. STAT. §§ 403.501-15 (1973).
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protection of said resources; prescribing the duties of the depart-
ment of legal affairs, political subdivisions, municipalities and
citizens of the state; providing for judicial proceedings relative to
the purposes of this act; authorizing intervention in all types of pro-
ceedings involving any injury to natural resources; providing for
assessing attorney's fees, court costs or requiring bond; recognizing
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; providing an
effective date.98
In short, it is difficult to find anywhere an indication that the grant
of standing provided by the Florida EPA should not be interpreted
as liberally as the broad language of the Act itself seems to suggest.
B. Applying the Statute: Interpretation and Construction
The EPA expressly confers on citizens of Florida" a cause of ac-
tion (1) to compel a governmental agency to comply with its duty to
enforce regulations designed to protect the natural resources of the
state 00 and (2) to enjoin any person, governmental agency or authority
from violating such laws, rules or regulations.10 1
There are several conditions precedent, however, to institution of
judicial proceedings. 10 2 First, the complaining party must file a veri-
fied complaint with the governmental agency or authority charged
by law with regulating or prohibiting offending conduct. 0 3 This com-
plaint must allege the "manner" in which the complaining party is
"affected." 104 Secondly, the governmental agency or authority is given
30 days to take "appropriate" action to correct the offending con-
duct. 10 5 The agency's failure to take such "appropriate" action enables
the complaining party to initiate judicial proceedings.' 06 Finally, the
plaintiff may be required to post a "good and sufficient" surety bond,
or cash, if the court has reasonable grounds to doubt the plaintiff's
ability to pay the costs of litigation and any judgment against him
should the other party prevail.0 7
The EPA also includes several explicit limitations. First, the only
remedy available is injunctive relief; 0 8 no damages can be awarded.
98. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-343.
99. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(a) (1973).
100. FLA. STAT. § 403A12(2)(a)(1) (1973).
101. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(a)(2) (1973).
102. See FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(c) (1973).
103. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(c) (1973).
104. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(c) (1973).
105. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(c) (1973).
106. See FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(c) (1973).
107. See FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(f) (1973).
108. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(3) (1973).
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The prevailing party, however, is entitled to costs and attorneys'
fees. 1°9 Thus, the court's discretion to assess costs among the parties
is expressly limited by the statute. This limitation on the court's
discretion may discourage potential plaintiffs who doubt the merits
of their cases, since the offending party's costs and attorneys' fees will
likely be considerable. Secondly, compliance with a currently valid
permit by the offending party is a defense to any EPA action. 110 Thus,
a citizen cannot sue those who are impairing, polluting or destroying
natural resources with an agency's approval.11 ' The plaintiff therefore
must sue the governmental source that granted the permit. If that
source is federal, the EPA's utility is questionable. Finally, the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply."11 This limita-
tion may cause problems when the offending party believes that a
second EPA suit raises issues previously litigated, and the complaining
party insists that the subsequent allegations are distinct.
Both the title of the EPA 1 3 and its limited legislative history" 4
suggest that the Act should be liberally construed. Moreover, judicial
treatment of similar legislation in other jurisdictions reflects a trend
toward expansive construction of EPA's by the courts." 5 Finally, and
presumably most importantly, the constitution of the State of Florida
seems to mandate"" that the courts interpret the EPA in a manner
that will comport with the state's policy to "conserve and protect
its natural resources." It seems apparent that conserving and protecting
natural resources requires a liberal interpretation of an act entitled
the Environmental Protection Act. Nevertheless, the language of the
statute is not precise. Judicial construction is necessary, and there is
room for a narrow interpretation that could severely limit the impact
of the Act.
109. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(f) (1973).
110. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(e) (1973).
111. An EPA plaintiff may challange the validity of a permit authorizing environ-
mental pollution, impairment or destruction because such a permit is contrary to the
state's constitutional policy, FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7, and to declared legislative intent.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 403.021 (1973). Seadade Indus. Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971), is the only reported case to date that interprets art. I, § 7.
In that case the court found that the constitutional policy imposed environmental con-
sideration as a limit on the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Id. It seems to
follow that such a policy also imposes a limit on the power of agencies to grant permits.
Therefore, a permit that authorizes environmental impairment may be invalid and, in
that case, such permit would not constitute a defense against an EPA suit. See FLA. STAT.
§ 403.412(2)(e) (1973).
112. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(4) (1973).
113. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
114. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text supra.
115. See notes 64-87 and accompanying text supra.
116. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7.
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(1) The Meaning of "Citizen"
(a) "Affected" Citizens
Perhaps the most critical provision that the courts must interpret
concerns the EPA's grant of standing to private citizens. 1 17 Judicial
construction of this grant will determine the EPA's effectiveness in
opening the courts to environmentally concerned plaintiffs. The pre-
requisite that the complaining party allege the "manner" in which he
is "affected""" possibly could be construed to require that a citizen
must plead a "special injury." 1 9 This interpretation of the Act, how-
ever, seems incorrect for several reasons. First, if the legislature had
intended to retain the "special injury" doctrine, then there was no
purpose in providing citizens with standing pursuant to the EPA:
citizens already enjoyed "special injury" standing under the common
law.' 20 Secondly, application of the special injury rule in effect closes
the courthouse doors to environmentally concerned citizens. This
result would fly in the face of the apparent legislative and constitution-
al intent to preserve and protect the natural resources of the state;"'
opening the courts to concerned citizens would help to ensure that
laws passed for protection of the environment are enforced.
12 2
Additionally, a restrictive interpretation of the standing provision
would distort the language and organization of the statute. Subsection
2(a) of the statute authorizes standing for citizens. Nowhere in that
subsection does the language refer to "special injury." Moreover,
the Department of Legal Affairs, political subdivisions and municipali-
ties are granted standing in the same clause. As governmental bodies,
these entities were never restricted by the special injury rule from
initiating environmental suits at common law. 123 Thus a special injury
requirement for private citizens' standing seems inconsistent with
the remainder of the subsection. If a complaint alleges that the plaintiff
is a citizen, standing should be established and the court should pro-
ceed to the merits of the case.' 24
117. See notes 59-63 and accompanying text supra.
118. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(c) (1973).
119. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supTa.
120. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 88-98 & 116 and accompanying text supra.
122. "Though legislation is a necessary first premise, it will be of no avail if not
effectively enforced." Jaffe, Ecological Goals and the Ways and Means of Achieving
Them, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 18 (1972).
123. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
124. See City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 308 N.E.2d 488, 493-94 (Mass.
1974); notes 75-79 and accompanying text supra.
Further, reading the "special injury rule" into the statutory requirement that the
verified complaint state the "manner in which the complaining party is affected," FLA.
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(b) Corporations as Citizens
The statutory grant of standing to citizens presents yet another
important issue-whether environmentally concerned corporations are
"citizens" under the Act. The practical consideration of the costs of
litigation makes resolution of this issue critical.125 The arguments favor-
ing an interpretation of the EPA that would abolish the "special in-
jury rule"'126 also are relevant to this inquiry. An act intended to open
the courthouse doors to citizens is of somewhat dubious value if the
"cover charge"-the cost of modern litigation-keeps most citizens out.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that a labor organization has
standing to sue on behalf of its members since, "if the union were not
given standing to sue on [the employees'] behalf, it is questionable
whether the employees would be afforded an 'efficient and expeditious
adjudication of their rights.' ",127 The same principle should apply to
EPA litigation. The Florida constitution provides "[t]he courts shall
be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay."' 28 It is doubtful that en-
vironmentally concerned citizens can be "afforded an 'efficient and
expeditious adjudication of their rights' " if "citizens" under the EPA
is construed to exclude an environmental organization from suing on
behalf of its members.129
STAT. § 403.412(2)(c) (1973), ignores the clear purpose of subsection (2)(c). Subsection
2(a) of the EPA grants standing and imposes no condition. The legislature obviously
was aware of the expansiveness of this statutory grant of standing, and, in order to
avoid unnecessary litigation, subsection 2(c) was added. If an agency charged with en-
forcing environmental laws is willing to enforce such laws, judicial intervention is un-
necessary and senseless. The purpose of requiring a party to file a verified complaint
with the relevant agency is to afford such agency an opportunity to act and moot the
proposed litigation.
125. See, e.g., Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572, 575
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12, 1974); see note 49 and
accompanying text supra.
126. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
127. Cannery Employees Local 444 v. Winter Haven Hospital, 279 So. 2d 23, 27
(Fla. 1973), citing Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
128. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 21.
129. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-31 (1963), which held that the plaintiff
corporation had standing to assert the rights of its members. The Court felt that litiga-
tion may be the only practical avenue for the redress of the members' grievances. Id.
at 430. Furthermore, the Court recognized that in some cases the most effective means
for redressing grievances is to associate for the purpose of litigation. See also United States
v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735
(1972). SCRAP and Sierra Club both held that an association has standing to litigate
the environmental injuries of its members if the members are injured in fact. "It is
clear that an organization whose members are injured may represent those members in
a proceeding for judicial review." 405 U.S. at 739.
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(2) The Role of the Courts
Whatever limitations the courts ultimately place on the EPA's
statutory grant of standing to citizens, it seems apparent that the Act
will make the courts more accessible to the environmentally concerned
plaintiff. But this might not be the most significant effect of the EPA.
Prior to enactment of the new law, administrative agencies were vested
with the duty to enforce environmental legislation.80 Their discretion
was extremely broad, and courts were reluctant to interfere with agency
decisions.1' The EPA marks the demise of the almost carte blanche
authority of administrative agencies concerned with environmental
regulation. Pursuant to the EPA, such an agency now can be compelled
to account for its decisions and actions in court. Furthermore, if those
actions are found to be in derogation of the agency's duty, the court
may require the agency to enforce the law.1 2 Thus the EPA provides
for checks and balances on bureaucratic decisions affecting the environ-
ment. Administrative agencies aware that they may be called into
court to justify their actions and inaction probably will become more
diligent, if only to avoid litigation and the possible embarrassment of
being overruled by the courts. Increased vigilance on the part of ad-
ministrative agencies resulting from the mere existence of the EPA
could well have a greater impact on the improved management of
the environment than will litigation authorized by the Act.'33
(3) Scope of Protection
The mere existence of statutory standing raises two additional,
complex issues. First, with which regulatory agency or authority does
the duty of enforcing particular laws for the protection of the en-
vironment rest?114 Secondly, which laws, rules and regulations are in-
tended to protect the air, water and other natural resources?' 3'
Eventually, definitive decisions will have to be reached charging
particular agencies with responsibility for the enforcement of environ-
mental laws ." This allocation of responsibility will have a beneficial
effect on environmental management: concerned citizens will be made
130. Sax & Connor, supra note 21, at 1005.
131. Id.
132. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(3) (1973).
133. See Sax & Connor, supra note 21, at 1050-54.
134. See FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(a)(1) (1973). See also Sax & Connor, supra note 21, at
1018.
135. See FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(a)(2) (1973).
136. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970); New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
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aware of the agencies responsible for protection of the environment.
This in turn will facilitate public scrutiny of the actions of those
agencies.
The second question raised by EPA standing also must be
answered by the courts. The judicial construction of "laws, rules or
regulations for the protection of the air, water, and other natural re-
sources"1l3 7 will determine the courts' jurisdiction under the EPA. If
a party brings an EPA action that the court determines does not seek
to compel an agency to enforce "laws, rules or regulations for the
protection of the air, water, and other natural resources," or to enjoin
a party from violating such laws, the court will be without jurisdiction
under the Act and will be required to dismiss the case.
On the other hand, the EPA might be liberally construed to im-
plement fully article II, section 7, of the Florida constitution, which
provides:
It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural
resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by
law for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive
and unnecessary noise.
Because of the all-encompassing implication of the language "laws,
rules or regulations" the EPA might be interpreted in a broad sense
to provide a cause of action even when state policy is contravened.
While such an expansive interpretation of the Act might seem unwar-
ranted, it is not entirely implausible when factors other than the pre-
cise statutory language are considered. Unlike other environmental
legislation the EPA neither proscribes specific conduct nor requires
specific affirmative state action, such as the expenditure of funds. In-
stead the Act is designed to provide judicial oversight of environmental
management, an objective that similarly could be realized by providing
a cause of action whenever constitutional policy is violated. Further-
more, the constitutional provision looks forward and calls for pro-
visions to implement it. ss The EPA looks back to existing laws de-
signed to protect the environment and becomes operative if such laws
are violated. The enforcement of those laws obviously is intended to
further constitutional policy, an intent that could be facilitated by
137. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(a); see note 88 and accompanying text supra.
138. It must be remembered, however, that article II, § 7, is not self-executing. Rather,
it only commands the legislature to enact legislation to further the state constitutional
policy. Therefore, article II, § 7, standing alone does not provide a cause of action. See
generally 6 FLA. JuR. Constitutional Law § 32 (1956). A cause of action may arise when
constitutional policy is violated only if the EPA is interpreted to implement article
II, § 7.
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enforcement of that policy itself through the use of EPA statutory
standing.
The language of the statute does, however, imply some limitation
on the courts' jurisdiction. For example, do laws that preserve and
conserve natural resources "protect" them? In delineating the scope of
"protection" it seems logical to consider the use of the terms "pollu-
tion," "impairment" and "destruction" in other sections of the Act.
139
Read in the context of this terminology, "protection" implies that
any law intended to benefit natural resources or prevent injury to
them is within the scope of the Act.
Furthermore, what do "natural resources" include besides air and
water? In Morrill v. Edward Ball Wildlife Foundation40 the trial judge
held that wildlife and fish are not natural resources. Furthermore, the
judge found that "impairment of navigation, as such, is not within
the scope of pollution, impairment or destruction of air, water and
other natural resources."' 4' A restrictive interpretation of the term
"natural resource" would seem to run against the very title of the
Environmental Protection Act. Any natural resource that constitutes
part of the environment of the state should come within the auspices
of the Act.
(4) Procedural Obstacles
Another limitation will result if a narrow definition of "state"
is read into the phrase "for the protection of the air, water, and other
natural resources of the state.' ' 4 2 A restrictive reading of "state" could
limit EPA protection to "sovereign" natural resources, that is, re-
sources actually owned by the state. Such a construction does not seem
logical for several reasons. The EPA provides a cause of action against
any "governmental agency."' 43 If "state" means "sovereign," then only
"state agencies" could be sued because non-sovereign agencies do not
enforce laws or regulate sovereign lands. The title of the EPA in-
cludes the clauses "resources of the state" and "resources"; this could
add strength to the argument that "of the state" is merely a qualifying
phrase to limit EPA actions to those involving resources within
139. FLA. STAT. §§ 403.412(2)(e)-(5) (1973).
140. No. 401 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. July 2, 1973), aft'd, No. U-29 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
May 12, 1974). See THE FLORIDA BAR, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND LITIGATION IN
FLORIDA app. G, § IV, at 602 (Continuing Legal Educ. Series 1973), summarizing the
holding in Ball.
141. No. 401.
142. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(a)(2) (1973).
143. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(a)(1) (1973).
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Florida's boundaries. 1  The statutory language, "citizen of the
state, ' ' 1 "5 reflects a similar intent to use "of the state" as a qualifying
phrase. Moreover, if the EPA is considered in context with the rest
of chapter 403, it is clear that its scope is not limited to sovereign re-
sources. For example, the Department of Pollution Control (DPC) has
jurisdiction over non-sovereign resources; the "waters" under DPC
auspices "shall include, but not be limited to rivers, lakes, streams,
springs, impoundments, and all other waters or bodies of water ....
Waters owned entirely by one person other than the state are included
only in regard to possible discharge on other property or water . . ."146
In another chapter concerning environmental legislation 14 7 "waters in
the state" is defined as "any and all water on or beneath the surface
of the ground or in the atmosphere . . . as well as all coastal waters
within the jurisdiction of the state."'14 8
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that "of the state" means
within the state. Moreover, no court yet has limited the EPA to ac-
tions involving sovereign resources, and, in fact, about half of the EPA
cases filed have involved non-sovereign natural resources.'
4 9
Subsection 2(c) of the Act presents still another possible limitation
on an EPA cause of action. That section provides that the offending
party be given 30 days "to take appropriate action.' ' 50 The standard
for "appropriate action," however, is not specified in the Act. A violat-
ing agency could delay the final resolution of an EPA action by alleging
that appropriate action had been taken. Furthermore, the merit of
such a dilatory tactic apparently would have to be resolved on a case-
by-case basis. 15 1 In one of the few cases decided under the EPA, Save
Our Bay' 5 2 the effect of "appropriate action" was discussed:
It is exceedingly difficult for us to reasonably perceive . . . that
appellant, comprising a group of lay citizens interested in protecting
144. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
145. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(a) (1973) (emphasis added).
146. FLA. STAT. § 403.031(3) (1973); see FLA. STAT. § 403.062 (1973); Memorandum of
Department of Pollution Control, January 21, 1974. See also FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 7, which
makes explicit the policy of the state to "protect its natural resources and scenic beauty."
147. FLA. STAT. ch. 373 (1973).
148. FLA. STAT. § 373.019(9) (1973).
149. See THE FLORIDA BAR, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND LITIGATION IN FLORIDA §
601.04 (Continuing Legal Educ. Series 1973).
150. FLA.. STAT. § 403.412(2)(c) (1973).
151. No settled standards exist as to what is "appropriate action" by an agency
for the myriad of possible violations of environmental laws. Furthermore, the court ap-
parently will presume that public officials are acting correctly. See Yonge v. Askew, 293
So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
152. Save Our Bay, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Pollution Control Comm'n, 285 So. 2d
447 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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and upgrading the environment, would have any further knowledge
of the action or nonaction of the appellees in the premises other
than that alleged in its complaint. To require appellant to plead
its case with more particularity and specificity would be inconsistent
with the well accepted and understood concept of liberality in
pleading.153
Thus, at least in the Second District, if any "appropriate" action is
taken by the offending party, such action must be communicated and
explained to the complaining party, in order to allow the latter to
amend its complaint or withdraw the suit. An EPA complaint has
been amended in at least one circuit court case.154 The 30-day waiting
period, which is required for the initial institution of EPA actions,
was not required to precede filing of the amended complaint.
55 An-
other hurdle plaintiffs must clear lies in subsection (2)(f) of the
Act. This portion of the Act authorizes the court to require a bond
if it appears that the plaintiff will be unable to pay any cost or judg-
ment.156 Only one case so far has required such a bond, in the amount
of 3500 dollars . 57 The statutory section allowing the bond unfortunate-
ly could condition justice on the complaining party's solvency. There-
fore, the courts should require bonds in only the most extreme cases.
5
1
If a bond is required frequently, many private citizens might be de-
prived of the judicial hearing of grievances that EPA statutory stand-
ing is intended to provide.
It is apparent that the ambiguities in the statute will thrust upon
the courts the responsibility to determine the scope of protection con-
ferred by the EPA. 59 Judicial construction of the EPA either will
cripple the Act or forge it into an effective system of checks and balances
on the bureaucracy charged with regulation of the environment.
C. EPA Litigation in Florida
Only three Florida EPA cases have yet reached the appeals court
153. Id. at 449.
154. Morrill v. Edward Ball Wildlife Foundation, Inc., No. 401 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct.
July 2, 1973), aff'd, No. U-29 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. May 12, 1974).
155. The verified complaint was filed with the Trustees on February 11, 1973. This
complaint was amended on March 30, 1973, and again in late April. The pretrial con-
ference order was issued on May 4, 1973. There was no mention by the trial judge that
an additional 30 days had to expire before judicial proceedings could begin.
156. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(f) (1973).
157. Morrill v. Edward Ball Wildlife Foundation, No. 401 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. July 2,
1973), af'd, No. U-29 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. May 12, 1974).
158. In some cases, of course, the plaintiff's cause of action may be so tenuous that
justice will require that he post a bond.
159. See notes 130-33 and accompanying text supra.
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level. Two of those cases reflect judicial willingness to broadly inter-
pret the Act.160 Orange County Audubon Society v. Hold6 ' held that
the Audubon Society, an incorporated conservation organization, was
a citizen within the meaning of the Act; therefore the Society was
found to have standing to sue under the EPA. The court recognized
that the language of the statute "evinces a legislative intent to make
enforcement of environmental laws and to make restraint of violations
thereof a responsibility of the government as well as the citizenry."
The opinion concluded that "[t]o treat a corporation as a 'citizen' is
consistent with ... the 'intent to be gathered from the context and the
general purpose of the whole legislation.' "162
In Save Our Bay, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Pollution Control
Commission,'63 a nonprofit organization also was found to have a
cause of action against a governmental agency that had allowed a private
company to pollute recreational waters. 6 4 Furthermore, plaintiff was
not required to show a special injury. 65 Audubon Society and Save
Our Bay both had been dismissed for lack of standing by the trial
courts. 66 The reversals by the appellate courts seem in agreement with
the Massachusetts case 1 67 that distinguished between standing and
jurisdiction, and found the standing question to be resolved by the
express language of the statute. 6 8 The Massachusetts court felt that
the real question presented was whether the lower court had jurisdic-
tion. 69 In other words, a court should search the pleadings to deter-
mine whether there is an alleged violation of a law, rule or regulation
for the protection of air, water or other natural resources." 0 If such a
violation is pleaded by the plaintiff, then the trial court has jurisdic-
tion.
160. Save Our Bay, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Pollution Control Comm'n, 285
So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Orange County Audubon Soc. v. Hold, 276
So. 2d 542 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The third case under the Florida EPA, Morrill
v. Edward Ball Wildlife Foundation, No. U-29 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. May 12, 1974),
adds little to EPA case law because the per curiam opinion merely affirms the lower
court's holding. Ball may be precedent for restrictive interpretation of the Act, since
the trial court dismissed the EPA complaint and construed the EPA rather narrowly.
See Morrill v. Edward Ball Wildlife Foundation, No. 401 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. July 2, 1973).
161. 276 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
162. Id.
163. 285 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
164. Id. at 449.
165. Id.
166. 276 So. 2d at 543; 285 So. 2d at 448.
167. City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 308 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 1974).
168. Id. at 493; see notes 73-82 and accompanying text supra.
169. See 308 N.E.2d at 493.
170. See FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(a)(1) (1973).
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D. Proposed Revisions of the EPA
The Committee on Environmental Protection (CEP) has proposed
revision of Florida's EPA to clarify some present ambiguities and to
preclude judicial imposition of limitations. 171 The proposed bill pro-
vides in part that a "person" can sue for "declaratory and equitable
relief," a change from the provision that now limits any "citizen" to
"injunctive" relief; the special injury rule is expressly abrogated; a
"notarized statement" replaces the "verified complaint"; the bond re-
quirements are amended to conform to the Florida Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure . 72 These revisions would clarify ambiguities in the EPA, and
should foreclose the possibility of a judicial construction of the Act
that would vitiate its utility to environmentally concerned plaintiffs.
Indeed, the outcome of Save Sand Key' 7 ' makes the favorable resolution
of the EPA special injury question paramount. If the special injury
rule is applied to EPA actions, then citizens' suits to abate environ-
mental destruction will be futile in most cases. The Save Our Bay court
refused to saddle EPA litigation with common law special injury re-
quirements,"' and such a holding seems consistent with the intent of
the Act. Nevertheless, Save Our Bay in part relied on the overruled
Second District Court of Appeals decision in Save Sand Key, 75 which
discarded the special injury rule for most environmental causes of ac-
tion brought by private citizens . 76 Therefore a legislative rejection of
the special injury requirement for EPA actions may be appropriate.
Neither Save Our Bay nor Audubon Society, 7 7 however, suggests
an immediate need to change "citizen" to "any person" since in
each of those cases the court interpreted "citizen" to include non-
profit corporations. Furthermore, it would be of questionable
value to confer standing on nonresidents of Florida to litigate
Florida's environmental issues. Restricting the statutory grant of
standing to citizens of Florida helps ensure that plaintiffs in EPA ac-
tions will have some personal stake in the outcome of the case. State
citizenship guarantees that the plaintiff will at least claim residency
in the state where the environmental injury is occurring. Additionally,
a citizen-plaintiff is more likely to have suffered injury in fact.178 Of
171. Fla. H.R. 173 (Comm. Substitute 1974).
172. Id.
173. No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12, 1974).
174. 285 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
175. Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12, 1974).
176. 285 So. 2d at 449.
177. See 276 So. 2d at 543.
178. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973), and Sierra Club, Inc. v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972), determined that an injury to many is no less
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course, national environmentalist groups17"9 may be more adequately
funded, and thus in a better position to meet the solvency require-
ment. A national group, however, could at least arouse state or local
interest if the natural resources are truly in need of protection by an
EPA suit.
The proposed revision of the EPA favorably responds to the
"citizen-person" dilemma. The revision affords a cause of action to
"persons,"' 18 0 thus clearly providing standing for corporations. At the
same time, however, the revision requires that the "person" be a
resident of Florida, 8 ' thereby ensuring that local interests will be at
issue in EPA litigation. This proposal appears to offer the wisest solu-
tion to the interpretive problems.
IV. CONCLUSION
The traditional practice of placing the enforcement of environ-
mental laws in the hands of administrative agencies seems unwise for
at least three reasons. First, there is a great potential for abuse in vest-
ing any body with such a sweeping mandate over so important a con-
cern. Secondly, such a practice seems to conflict with the checks and
balances system that is basic to American government. Finally, the
avenue for increased citizen input into the management of the en-
vironment effectively can be barred by bureaucratic procedures. The
Florida Environmental Protection Act of 1971 marks the end of the
traditional practice. The citizenry, through EPA causes of action, is
afforded henceforth a voice in environmental management. Moreover,
by means of EPA litigation the judiciary can police environmental
regulations and participate in environmental protection. Such judicial
deserving of judicial review than is a special injury. In order to establish standing,
however, a party must allege that he has been injured in fact. 405 U.S. at 734-35. A
mere claim of special interest in the lawsuit is not enough. 412 U.S. at 685. Injury in
fact to a legal interest must occur to ensure that the plaintiff will have a sufficient
personal stake in the outcome of the case. Id. at 687; 405 U.S. at 732-33. The state
citizenship requirement of the Florida EPA helps ensure that this injury in fact require-
ment is met, because the plaintiff will at least be a Floridian. Thus he will have a
minimum degree of particularized interest in the alleged environmental damage that
he claims is occurring within the state. Opening the court to EPA action by non-resi-
dents could generate litigation by groups with no interest whatsoever in the state
except for a general interest in environmental protection. This general interest may
not constitute a sufficient personal stake to ensure that the group presents the dispute
in an adversary context. If this did occur and an outside group were to lose an EPA action
because it failed adequately to present its case, then the doctrine of collateral estoppel
might prevent others from bringing subsequent EPA action. See FLA. STAT. § 403A12(4)
(1973).
179. E.g., National Sierra Club or the Audubon Society.
180. Fla. H.R. 173 (Comm. Substitute 1974).
181. Id.
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intervention in the environmental regulatory scheme should ensure
that environmental protection legislation is effectively and efficiently
enforced, and effective enforcement of environmental laws is the key
to furthering the constitutional policy of protecting and preserving
Florida's natural resources and scenic beauty. Thus, the EPA is the
linchpin of the environmental protection scheme because it helps
guarantee that environmental regulations will be observed. When
called upon to construe the EPA, it is therefore important that the
courts read the statute in the broad manner that will comport with
its significance and purpose.
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